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RECENT BOOKS 
THE LAw OF TRADE SECRETS. By Amedee E. Turner. London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, Ltd.; South Hackensack, N. J.: Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1962. 
Pp. xxxi, 519. $21.50. 
Whatever may be said for the "trade secrets" themselves, the law of 
trade secrets seems to be moving slowly out of the realm of the esoteric in 
which it has habitually dwelt. The increasing importance of the subject, 
and hence the slowly increasing attention that it currently seems to be 
receiving, probably stems from several factors: (I) the sharp increase in 
technological activity in recent years; (2) the complexity of much of the 
new technology-a complexity that manages to keep a step or two ahead 
of the increasing adeptness in and facilities for ferreting out the informa-
tion that one would fain keep to one's self; (3) a somewhat disturbing 
"tradition" of secrecy that may be getting stronger rather than weaker-a 
tradition to which the extensive and often excessive efforts in this regard 
of the military establishments may contribute in no small part;1 and (4) 
a tendency, discernible to at least some students of the subject, to rely less 
upon the patent system, and more upon secrecy, for the protection of new 
ideas.2 
Given the continued operation of these forces, and there is little in 
the present situation to suggest their lessening, one may expect a steady 
accretion of new and increasingly complex technology, more and more 
efforts to keep such technology secret, and more and more efforts by out-
siders to discover the secrets. All this adds up to a corresponding increase 
in controversy, and therefore law, in the trade secret area. Consequently, 
Mr. Turner's book appears upon the scene at a convenient time, provided 
it has something new to offer-as it does. -
The author divides his discussion into five main areas, which he de-
scribes as follows (pp. 3-4): 
"The first question, defined in Part II is: Is the subject matter (the 
so-called trade secret) capable of protection? The second question, de-
fined in Part III, is: Are there special circumstances relating to em-
ployment which withdraw subject-matter otherwise protectable from 
protection, on the ground that public policy refuses to fetter the per-
sonal skill, knowledge and experience of any individual? The third 
question, defined in Part IV, is: Was the subject-matter dealt with in 
such a way, by disclosure from one person to another, that a relation-
ship is created which controls the activity of the disclosee in relation 
to the subject-matter? The fourth question, if the alleged misuser of 
1 This is not inconsistent with simultaneous efforts of governments to pry more deeply 
into private affairs by means of lie detectors, wiretaps, extensive record and tab-keeping, 
etc. Card players who would sneak a peek at an opponent's hand while playing their own 
cards dose to the chest are not unheard of. 
2 This is not the place to discuss the possible reasons for this; it is enough to note 
that the situation exists. Indeed, there are some who insist that in many ostensible patent 
license situations, the licensee is more interested in getting the attending know-how than 
in getting the patent rights themselves. 
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the subject-matter is a stranger to the person who claims it as his, is 
defined in Part V, and is: Is this stranger bound by the manner in 
which he acquired the disclosure? The last main question, defined in 
Part VI is: To what extent did the subsequent history of the secrecy 
of the subject-matter alter the liabilities and rights of the parties?" 
More concretely, one might describe the major areas of analysis as: 
(1) the type of subject matter that is capable of protection: processes, ma-
chines, know-how, ideas, secret information such as chemical formulae, 
customer lists, sources of supply, etc.; (2) the respective rights of the em-
ployer and the employee in information obtained, or ideas developed, by 
the latter; (3) the respective rights of the discloser of trade secrets and 
the persons to whom he discloses them (involving problems of express and 
implied contract, confidential relationship, unjust enrichment, etc.); (4) 
the rights of, or limitations imposed upon, third parties who learn of the 
secret without having a contractual or confidential relationship with the 
"owner,'' and (5) the extent and scope of legal protection against unau-
thorized use of disclosure. Within this general break-down, the author 
further subdivides the discussion into separate treatments of English and 
United States law. 
The conclusions that the author comes to--conclusions that unequivo-
cally flow from the common-law case materials (statutes play little part in 
this field), both in England and the United States-are that trade secrets, 
once they become known to others (and until this happens, it is hard to 
conceive of many legal problems arising), are protectible against a given 
use or disclosure only where circumstances support a finding (I) of a con-
tract, express or implied, not so to use or disclose, (2) of a confidential rela-
tionship, express or implied, that bars such usage or disclosure, or (3) in 
the United States, that "unjust enrichment" would result from such use or 
disclosure. 
There is little disposition, fortunately, to resort to "property" concepts 
except in an occasional case where physical devices or written documents 
containing trade secret material are involved.3 There is little tendency, and 
then only in the United States, to resort to "unfair competition" concepts 
except as they tie in with doctrines of contract or breach of confidence. 
Lastly, there is little disposition to inquire openly into the "public policy" 
concepts that are constantly in the forefront in patent litigation, such as 
the effect upon competition or monopoly, the desirability of public access 
to technological or other information, and the stimulus and encourage-
ment to inventive effort and research. About the only exceptions are the 
occasions when the courts are influenced by overt restraints upon competi-
s Judge Learned Hand put both the "property" and "public policy" considerations 
into proper perspective in RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), when 
he said at 90: " 'Property' is a historical concept; one may bestow much labor and in. 
genuity which inures only to the public benefit; 'ideas,' for instance, though upon them 
all civilization is built, may never be 'owned.' The law does not protect them at all, but 
only their expression; and how far that protection shall go is a question of more or 
less." 
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tion that at times collaterally attend "trade secret" relationships or agree-
ments, and their recognition of the importance of not depriving artisans 
and the like of their means of livelihood by restricting them unduly in the 
use of their inventions or in undertaking further inventive activities. 
All in all, the picture we get-and one that the author seems to accept 
without any serious question-is very much in line with certain hallowed 
traditions of the common law: the respective rights of the litigating parties 
are to be determined largely by what they have agreed to do, or by obliga-
tions that inescapably follow from the relationship between them. The fact 
that, more often than not, the terms of the agreement are dictated more by 
the court than by the parties themselves, and that the obligations are those 
that the court (influenced by "public policy" considerations?), rather than 
the parties, thinks should stem from the relationship, does not seem to give 
the courts (or the author) pause, any more than it did back in the days 
when they were reading assumption of risk, contributory negligence and 
implied contract into the master-servant and fellow servant relationships. 
Ironically, some of the most troublesome legal situations (as witness the 
employer-employee and "personal skill" cases) arise in those cases where 
the parties clearly and unequivocally agreed to terms of use and disclosure 
. which did not square with the court's idea of what seemed fair and reason-
able. 
Within the conceptual limits indicated above, the author has done a 
workmanlike job and makes a contribution to the understanding of pre-
vailing "trade secret" law. The contribution should prove especially useful 
to the practicing lawyer, for the author has taken all the significant cases 
in both countries, classified them accurately and in detail, and analyzed, 
distinguished and compared them in the accepted precedent-oriented tra-
dition of legal brief writing. In an area of the law where this type of case 
analysis is distressingly scant, his well-phrased and easy-to-read contribu-
tion4 should prove useful for some time to come, that is, pending such 
legislative enactments or shift in judicial approach as may bring about a 
sharp change in the law. In addition to the basic text analysis and discus-
sion, he includes three appendices which set forth some useful and original 
procedures for deali.ng with submitted ideas, suggested forms for royalty 
agreements, and a collection of English Commonwealth trade-secret cases. 
The book is not without its shortcomings. The attempt at detailed 
classification on the basis of the type of reasoning used by the courts, in 
the face of the courts' proclivity for hopelessly scrambling the various ra-
tionales, necessarily results in considerable repetition and "infra-supra" 
references. The separate treatment of English and United States cases has 
the same result. Granted that some differences do exist in the law of the 
two countries, one may question whether they are sufficient to make this 
separate treatment necessary or desirable. As to workmanship, the book 
contains somewhat more than its fair share of typographical errors (which, 
4 The English, on the whole, seem to write English better than Americans. 
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of course, do little harm, except as they may offend aesthetic senses and di-
vert reviewers, in their excitement and glee at discovering them, from talk-
ing about important things). Its format is such that it is often difficult to 
distinguish the case quotations from the author's commentary. Although the 
Index is adequate, the Table of Contents and page headings are less so. 
Beyond these rather minor points, the author's apparently unquestion-
ing acceptance of the settled judicial approach to trade secret law results 
in his giving little attention to the underlying public policy aspects of the 
subject, except occasionally in those rare areas, noted above, where the 
courts themselves have seen fit to do so. Absorbed in this approach, he 
tends to neglect, or deal only summarily with, many areas of the law in 
which crucial policy issues do arise and require judicial discussion. Thus, 
he pays little attention to the impact of "unfair competition" law, gives 
only scant treatment to the crucial issues involved in the International News 
case/5 ignores the difficult relationships and policy issues attending such 
things as style piracy, common-law copyright, the broadcasting or photo-
graphing of sports events, radio or TV broadcasting of musical arrange-
ments, "shop rights" in the employer-employee relationship, how far re-
straints upon ex-employees may go, and the like. 
True, the author, in neglecting these areas, fairly accurately reflects the 
underlying approaches of the courts, which show only slight interest in 
such matters. The trouble is that plaguing policy questions do arise in 
this field which will necessarily become more insistent as, and if, the con-
troversies over trade secrets increase in frequency and importance. How 
shall the antitrust and related laws and the trade secret law adjust to each 
other? And the trade secret law and patent policy?6 In this same area, should 
there be a law relating to limitations upon use, disclosure, exchange, and 
so on, for trade secrets similar to that which has developed with respect to 
patents? How far should the law go in protecting trade secrets against col-
lateral attack? (The St. Regis situation, the antitrust grand jury controver-
sies, the unsuccessful Kefauver demand for steel company data, and the con-
troversies in the ITC over the disclosure of secret information, are examples 
of the problem areas.) What type of protection, short of relying upon private 
contract or upon existing institutions such as the patent system, could or 
should we provide for corporate employees and independent inventors to 
make sure that they get a fair shake? It is significant that in most European 
Ii International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
6 Cf. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park &: Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), in which the 
Court rejected the contention that trade secrets should be treated the same as patents 
in passing upon the validity of restrictive conditions. The Court said at 401-04: "The 
complainant urges an analogy to rights secured by letters patent. . . • But whatever 
rights the patentee may enjoy are derived from statutory grant under the authority con-
ferred by the Constitution. This grant is based upon public considerations. The purpose 
of the patent law is to stimulate invention by protecting inventors for a fixed time in the 
advantages that may be derived from exclusive manufacture, use and sale. . . . The 
complainant has not seen fit to make the disclosure required by the statute and thus to 
secure the privilege it confers. Its case lies outside the policy of the patent law." 
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countries considerable statutory law has developed with respect to em-
ployee inventions, in contrast to both the United States and England which 
continue to rely largely upon private contract and the common law. Per-
haps most important of all, what can be done, if anything, in a world where 
technological effort and development have become supremely important, 
to provide greater stimulus toward inventive effort and the prompt dis-
closure and maximum use of new ideas and information? In the past, we 
have looked to the patent system to provide the necessary stimulus. It is 
not at all clear, today, that this is sufficient-yet, we continue to go along 
with a "trade secret" law that contributes little to, and, in many respects, 
actually obstructs this public objective.7 
One may surmise that, if the area of trade secrets continues to increase 
in importance, such questions will more and more insistently present them-
selves. Sooner or later, they will have to be answered. And if the lessons of 
history mean anything, either the courts must answer them, as they have 
not done thus far, or the legislative bodies will do it for them. The "trade 
secrets" area is, of course, no more immune to legislative response to 
judicial action or inaction than are other fields. Congress has enacted laws 
relating to trade secrets and secret data,8 and has seriously considered other 
proposals in this and related fields.9 
All these, as I say, are underlying considerations to which Mr. Turner 
does not address himself. But they, after all, are another story and another 
book. We should perhaps be content with the fact that the author has 
taken on the somewhat narrower, though concededly no less difficult, area 
to work in and has made a competent and useful contribution within that 
area. 
John Stedman, 
Professor of Law, 
University of Wisconsin 
7 See Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 Omo ST. L.J. 4, 31 (1962). 
8 E.g., Federal Trade Commission Act § 6(£), 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) 
(1958), excepting "trade secrets and names of customers" from the authority granted the 
Commission to make information public; Pub. L. No. 87-813, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 
15, 1962), giving copies of Census reports in company files a confidential status; cf. St. 
Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961). 
9 E.g., S. 1728, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. (1883), a proposal for giving limited protection to 
news disseminations, referred to in International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 
U.S. 215, 264-66 (1918); S. 2075, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), Design Protection Act; H.R. 
1270, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), a bill to protect music performers' rights. 
